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ABSTRACT 
This paper documents the fiscal year (FY) 2006 assessment to evaluate potential chemical and 
radiological hazards associated with vessels and piping in the former plutonium process areas at 
Word's Plutonium Finishing P b t  (PFP}. Evaluations by PFP engineers as design authorities 
for specik systems d other subjec-matter experts were conducted to identify the chemical 
hazards associated with m s i t i d n g  the proc~ss ueas for the long-term layup of PFP before its 
eventual fd demntamjnation and decommissioning @&D). D&D activities in the main 
process facilities were suspended in September 2005 for a period of between 5 and 10 years. 
A previous assessment conducted in FY 2003 found that certain activities to mitigate chemical 
hazards could be deferred safely until the D&D of PFP, which had been scheduled to result in a 
slab-on-grade canditibn by 2009. As PI result of necessary plarming changes, however, D&D 
activities at PFP will be delay4 until after the 2009 time hme 
Given the extended project and plant life, it was determined that a review of the plant chemical 
M should be conductd This review to determine the extended life impact of chemicals is 
called the Plartonium Firrishing Plant chemical H m r &  Assessmeni, IT 2006. This FY 2006 
assessment addresses ptential chemical and tadiologid h d  areas identified by facility 
personnel and subject-matter experts who reevaluated all the chemical systems (items) from the 
FY 2003 assessment. This paper provides the results of the FY 2006 chemical hazards 
assasment and describes the methodology used to assign a hazard ranking to the items reviewed. 
INTRODUCTION 
The FY 2006 assessment was unde- to identify and evaluate potenlkd chemical hazards 
associated with vessels and piping in the former process axeas of the PFP. Engineers and 
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subject-matter experts identifd and evaluated the chemical h d s  associated with 
transitioning the proccss mas for long-term layup of the PFP facility. The layup of the facility 
was necessary when DgcD activities in the main process facilities were suspended in September 
2005. A previous assessment, HNF- 1397 1, Plutonium Finishing Plnnf Residual Chemical 
H m r c b  Assessment [I] (FY 2003 RCHA), found that in some, cases certain activities to mitigate 
chemical hazards could be deferred safely until PFP D&D, which was scheduled to result in a 
slabon-grade condition in 2009. With the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’S) direction to 
suspend much of D&D work at PFP, many of the mitigation activities were not initiated. In 
some cases, D8tD activities were initiated but not completed, potentially increasing the hazard. 
The FY 2006 assessment addresses potential chemical hamd areas identified by facility 
personnel and re-visits all items from the FY 2003 RCHA. The 2006 hazards assessment report, 
HNF-29561, Plubunim Finishing Plant Chemical Hazard Assessment FY2006 [Z], provides the 
results of the FY 2006 chemical M s  assessment, and is intended to k used as information to 
identify residual chemical and some radiological risks that need to be addressed during the layup 
process. 
The evaluation process used for items in the FY 2006 assessment included the following 
considerations and methods: 
Identification of potential chemical hazard meas identified by PFP personnel duritlg a series 
of hazard assessment meetings 
Assessment acthities (including walkdowns of current plant configurations) perform4 by 
design authorities 
Application of a risk-based relative ranking system, evaluation criteria, and relative risk 
ranking methods to assess4 items 
Verification workshops held to review evaluation forms, mure consistency, and M z e  the 
E S U l t S  
4 Independent review of process and methodology employed. 
h e r d  findings and specific c o n m s  provided a description of the assessment results, and the 
conclusions of the assessment. 
BACKGROUND 
In response to a chemical tank explosion in the Plutonium Reclamtion Facility (PRF}, in 
May 1997, PFP personnel performed several assessments to identify chemical risks md 
mitigating activities naessary to address those risks. One of those assessments, the P W  
FY 2003 RCHA, was completed in December 2003 using a risk-based relative ranlciig system 
that provided a hazard score for each item (Le., process equipment M system) assessed. The 
FY 2003 RCHA was conducted to satisfy Hmford Fe&d Fuciliw Agreement and Consent 
Order [3] Milestone M-83-21, Submit t~ the Washin@on Stale Department of Ecology u PFP 
Residual Chemicul Hmwds Assessment as a Primmy Document. Infomtion reviewed for the 
2 
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FY 2003 RCHA included vessel inventory databasa, engineering drawings, process histmy 
information, interviews of bath engineering and design authority personnd, and physicd 
inspections by subjectmatter experts. The FY 2003 RCIEA was updated in FY 2006 to identify 
residual chemical risks remaining in the Eaciity and those resulting from DgcD efforts since the 
last evaluation. 
The FY 2003 chemical hazards assessment began with an item-by-item examination of items that 
were of highest concern at that time and then adding new items as a result of the physical 
inspections and document reviews conducted. 
Once inspections were comphted, each item was evaluated and scored. As paxt of this scoring, a 
numerical value was assigned to reflect the level of confidence in the available data used in 
assessing a particular item. Previous assessments had used data quality numbers from 1 (best) to 
5 {worst). For the FY 2003 RCHA, the quality of characterization data w a s  rated as ‘ 1 ’ for all 
systems that were physicdly inspected. This value of ‘ 1 ’ reflected the high Level of conl7dence 
in the infirmation as a result of the physical inspection of the items, or for those items that were 
difficult to inspect, reflected the confidence in the information researched 
Hazard scores for items assessed in 2003 were detemhd in part by the likelihood of 
occurrenm involving the loss of control of a material through an mmmlled reaction or a leak. 
L&elhod factors were mitigated due to p h e d  and scheduled D$D activities that would 
either shortly address the hazard or completely dismantle and m o v e  the equipment or sy-m 
thereby eliminating the W. 
With the suspension of D&D activities in the process facilities, cumplding D&D activities will 
be delayed until a much later date than assumed during the FY 2003 RCHA. The FY 2003 
RCHA aited PFP planning documents that had PFP facilities to a slabon-grade condition by 
2009. In some cases, unfinished DkD activities may have increased an item’s potentid for an 
UnGontsOlled reaction or leak release. In other c m  D&D activities herd not yet heen initiated. 
As the FY 2003 RCHA miti@ed certain hazard scores based on anticipated completion of D&D 
activities, delay of those D&D d i t i e s  may result in higher hazard scores for the assessed 
items. 
FY 2006 CHEMIC& HAZARDS ASSESSMENT PROCESS 
The FY 2006 chemical hazards assessment was perfomed to identify the risks posed by residual 
chemicals at PFP that remain after deferring D&D activities. This assessment made use of the 
established PFP risk-based relative rankhg method (used for the FY 2003 R C M )  that waluates 
risk relative to human health and the envirotlment and to personnel safety, With the direction to 
suspend process facility D&D, some activities previously planned to addpess residual chemical 
r i s b  have been stopped, This asmsment identifies items requiring mitigation w further 
evaluation before a long-term safe codguration can be achieved or where continued monitoring 
or surveillance will be necessary during the layup period. PF’P management will use the 
information and recommendations from this assessment to supplement layup plans as necessary. 
The layup period for this evaluation is defrned as between 5 and 20 years to allow for a margin 
of safety beyond the regulatory cleanup milestone date of 2016. 
3 
P a p  11 of 21 of DA04304818 
WM’07 Conference, February 25 -March 1 , 2007, Tucson, AZ 
To accomplish a comprehensive evaluation, a team of safety, process engineering, scientists, and 
technical specialists was assembled. Team members conducted either physical inspections by 
‘watkdowns,’ or relied on system codiguration documentation and personnel testimonies to 
assess the items. Domentation relating to the item assessed was gathered. Once mas were 
addressed, the PFP chemical hazard facility vulnerabiiity assessment V A )  datibase was 
updated on an item by item basis. This database contains evaluation information on each item 
reviewed and provides each item’s relative risk hazard SCOR. 
The general approach for the FY 2006 work was as follows: 
Identify high-priority residual chemical concerns as identified by PFP personnel during an 
extended series of hazard assessment meetings; 
Evaluate areas of high-priority residual chemical c o n m s  and areas known to have I 
changed status because of D&D activities perfhmd on the systems, using physical 
inspedons, records review, and inteniews; 
Re-assess remaining items identified during the FY 2003 RCHA, and 
Updak PFP chemical hmrd database and compute risk-based ranking hazard scores for aLl 
items reviewed. 
The scope of the FY 2006 review included areas identified by PFP personnel prior to start of the 
assessment activities. A series of meetings were held to describe existing hazards and potential 
new hazards at PFP due to the extension of the facility’s life. The meetitlgs relied on the 
opinions of design authorities and subject-matter experts for the various facilities, laboratories, 
and systems. Because of these meetings, certain chemical hazards related to PFP process vessels 
and systems were identified. These were called high-priority items. High priority items for 
evaluation kcludd the following: the 2Qinch vacuum system; 291 -Z building galvanized 
ducting; the PRF pend tanks and gallery gloveboxes; 242-2 Waste Treatment Facility, 
including the 242-2 filter box; E4 ventilation system (process area ventiIilation system), 
plutonium transfer lines, m t e  mechanical A line; remb mechanical C line; the Analytical 
Laborcttory; the Standards Laboratory; the Plutonium Process Support Laboratory; M, 
2735-2 Bulk Chemical Storage Tank Building; sealed systems with the potential for hydrogen 
buildup; and radioactive acid digestion test unit. These high-priority items were the first to be 
assessed by the physical inspections. 
Equipment and systems were inspected physically to the practical extent afforded by access atld 
visibility rehctions. The wdkdown~ hvdved lookkg at the equipment, piping, vessel, or 
glovebox. Above-grade pipdines to and fiom the itern dso wax  inspected. Finally, the area 
mund each item was inspected for secondary problems or &@thg barriers. Conditions 
offering possibilities for unfavomble htmactions included overhad sprinkler h s ,  other 
vessels, or other nearby chemical transfer lines, Possible mitigating barriers could include 
blanked ports on a glovebox or the glovebox itself as sealed wnt&menL Secondary problems 
4 
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resulting from an uncontrolled reaction or a leak release (e-g., potential for a leak to occur, and 
for the leak4 fluid to corrode a safety system below) were also examined. 
Areas previously evaluated but changed in configuration due to D&D activities received the next 
highest priority. All of the previous FY 2003 RCHA items were dm re-evaluated during the 
walkdowns as the third priority. 
Waste tanks in the 24 1-2 Liquid Liquid Waste Treatment Facility were not assessed as D&D 
activities for these tanks are on-going. 
Areas difficult to physically inspect because of their conditions, which involvd high 
contamination levels or lack of a practical access were nevertheless assessed through document 
reviews. 
In addition to the physical inspections conducted, a records review was conducted for certain 
items us@ a graded approach. These records were used to document existing conditions; record 
mitigation measures already taken to reduce risk, such as tamk removals, tank emptying and 
flushing, and line draining and flushing+ Rscords reviewed included, but were not limited to, the 
following: 
Workpackages 
0 Process flow sheets 
Process documentation 
rn Engineering drawings. 
These records as well as current photographs, ifavailabie, were associated with the database in 
support files. Data was colleckd based on a graded approach, Le., there are less data for items 
with less relative risk than for those items with greater relative risk. Because of the graded 
approach, data packages with the a d d i t i d  inform& ’on were not necessary for some items. 
The relative risk of each residual chemical wncern being assessed was quantified by using the 
existing FY 2003 RCHA risk qmMcation methodology. Data quality and the hzmrd 
characteristics of the material associated with the item being assessed were a h  factored into the 
hazard score. A description of these hazaTd scaring factors is presented in this section. 
Evdudon forms prepared for process equipment and systems nssessed, contain hazard score 
factors along with other pertinent information (e.g., identification, location, chemicals, 
assm~om, status, and controls). Because of acknowledged limitations of the FY 2003 RCHA 
methodology, special wr3cation worksbops were held during the FY 2008 assessment, to 
review, ensure consistency, and finalize the evaluation forms. Reviewers were acknowledged 
experts in nuclear safety, chemistry, and PFP process history, 
Eight severity and likelihood factors we= used, as was the case in the FY 2003 RCHA. The 
following factwrs, in addition to data quality arrd hazard ckactmistics of material, were 
5 
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considered to influence the severity of consequences resulting from the loss of control of 
material, such as through an uncontrolld reaction or a leak release or to influence the likelihood 
of occurrences involving the loss of control of a material. 
Three types of severity factors were considered : 
(1) Potential for human injury. Considerations included accessibility to personnel, number of 
persons potelltially af€&ed, and expected severity. 
(Z} Potential for human exposure. Considerations included vessel location relative to people, 
number of persons potentidly dfected, and likely exposure scenarios. 
(3) Potential and signikmce of secondary hpact. Considerations included other systems, 
structum, and components that could magnify wonsequences, e.g., presence of radioiwtive 
contamination, safety-critical systems, ventilation systems; and considerations such as 
distances or barriers between systems, and hazard characteristics of materids impacted. 
Five types of likelihood factors were considered 
(1) Design. Considerations included safety features, as applicable; a.g., pressure relief, 
secondary containment, air filtration, hydrogen mitigation, shielding, and seismic resistance 
capacity. 
(2) Operation. Considerations included whether the vessel and m y  ancillary equipment are 
operated as designed, per mmufactwefs specifications (includi design life), md within 
the documented safety envelope. 
(3) Containment vessel condition. Considerations included integri~ testing, protection from 
corrosion, modifications that potentially degrade integrity, and visual condition. 
(4) Emergency planning and safety authoridon basis. Considerations included whether the 
configuration of the containment vessel and ancillary equipment is adequately &cumented, 
reviewed, and approved; and whether it is subject to established programs, such as for 
inventmy control, standards and requirements identification, authorization basis, fire 
protection, and emergency planning. 
( 5 )  Maintenance and inspection. Consideration included whether preventive maintenance and 
inspections are scheduled regularly and implementmi 
M a w e  of the possibility ofunrecognized increased risk due to the lack of adequate information 
about an assessed item, data quality was rated h e d  on the following criteria: 
Co&dence in data is hip;h/Score is assimed as '1 ': data is of sufficient quality and 
completeness for safety characterization and system conditionlcontents are supported by: 
o Testimony provided by a person with primary knowledge, or 
I 
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o Process Knowledge that is supported by controlled, peer-reviewed documentation, or 
o Analvtical Data generated under an established/documented quality assurance plan and is 
consistent with intended use. 
Confidence in data is medidscore is assimed as '3': data is of marginal quality and 
complemess for safety charactmizathn, and system conditionlcontents are supported by: 
o Testimony provided by a person with reasonable exp&on of accuracy {a.g., design 
authority, subject-matter expert) but not primary howledge, or 
Q Process Knowledge that is supported by other information (e.g., weekly reports, 
memoran& or other uncontrolled documentation). Not strictly peer reviewed but on 
ddbution and subject to comment and revision, or 
o Analytical Data at a lower quality level than neded to fully characterize (i.e., screening 
data, non-validated data}. Some quality assurance requirements, but not an established 
Program. 
Confidence in data is hwlScore is assimed as '5': System coaditiodcontents are not supported 
by testimony, process knowledge, or atdytkd data. 
These data quality definitions differ somewhat h m  those used during the FY 2003 RCHA and 
other previous assessments, but were adoptgd for use during the FY 2006 assessment. As during 
the FY 2003 RCHA, materials in an item being assessed were assigned to one or more of the 
four hazard p u p s  based on their reactivity ham& 
Group (1): explosive, unstable reactive, unstable over time (e.g., because of aging in storage 
or contamination during use), and organic peroxides [29 Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR) 1910.1200], This group was assigned a score of '16' in order to give more emphasis to 
potentially explosive conditions. 
Group (2): pyrophoric, water reactive, flammable gas, fissile materials (29 CF'R 191 0.1 200). 
This group was assigned a score of '9.' 
Group (3): corrosive and highly toxic materials (29 CFR 1910.1003,1017,1044-50). This 
group was assigned a score of '4: This is because of the generally small quantities associated 
with highly toxic materials and the non-explosive, non-flammable nature of the chemicals in 
this group. 
Group (4): all other matmiah (generally not very reactive but, may be fl-ble or toxic). 
This group was assigned a score of '1.' 
The severity and liikelihood factors were scored by assigning d u e s  of '1' through '5.' The data 
quality values were assigned as either '1,' '3,' or '5,' The h d  p u p  of material for each item 
was w e d  the value '1' to reflect as representing the best condition and the value '5' as 
repmating the worst condition, Hazard scoring was perfmned on each item evaluated. 
7 
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For scoring, a lower n u m k  is consided better, Le., more safe than a higher number. Both the 
FY 2003 RCHA and the FY 2006 assessment scoring criteria ranged from a minimum score of 
2’ through a maximum attainable score of ‘100.’ This spread was established deliberately to 
provide good relative ranking of the data. To a~count for i tem that cmntly are removed h m  
the system and shipped, or awaiting shipment (and thus posing zeru, risk), the score criteria w e  
modified to provide 8 score of ’O’, 
The FY 2003 RCHA methodology was used h the past as a way to prioritize residual chemical 
concerns, but the FY 2006 effort needed to be supplemented for the current effort in order to 
mure that an acceptable level of risk for the layup period is def’bed and achieved, This section 
discusses acbwIedged limitations of the FY 2003 R C M  methodology for this application and 
describes how it was augmented in the form of verification workshops. Several limitations were 
identified: 
(1) In the past, there has been some variability @mfessional a d -  and judgment of risk} 
between evaluators for the m e  kind of residual chemical and situations. 
(2) Many of the factors contributing to criteria for determining ‘Ljlcelihood Ranking’ will be 
impacted by layup or could change during the maintenanoe and surveillance period following 
layup. For example, ‘Containment vessel condition’ is likely to change over time due to 
aging, corrosion and other effects. Also, activities during layup could include additional 
mitigating d o n s  such as extended surveillances. 
(3) The ’risk evaluation scoring’ algorithm is complex and not specifically designed to produce 
absolute risk values that could be correlated to worker health effects and traditional risk 
acceptance values. 
Accordingly, the FY 2003 RCHA process was supplemented by reviewing all identified residual 
chemical i d  radiological risk cotlcem in special vdfication workshqs. The vefication 
workshop team wmisted of a chemical hazard specialist, an accident analysis specialist, and 
cognizant engineers responsible for the p m s  systems and equipment being addressed. 
Personnel with expert process and historical huwledge of the systems and equipment being 
addressed also attended the workshops, All information was nomlalized by being reviewed by 
the same group. The verification team also considered how the hazard might change over a 5 to 
20 year period. Special care was given to determining the relative uncertainty of the information 
involved, in the form of the data quality filctor. 
To maximize the effectiveness of the planned use of the data in this report, an independent 
review by a subject-matter expert was performed. The review focused on the assessment process 
and the risk scoring methodology USBd in the FY 2006 chemical hazards assessment. 
The review process used in the FY 2006 effort involved a systematic approach in which items 
were evaluated with mpect to a single d&nd set of criteria by a team of participants with 
appropriate knowledge of equipment, systems, history, relevant chemistry and safety issues. The 
scoring system employed is one that provides a consistent methodology fox addressing factors 
which influence risk. 
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The review found that the system used in this assessment produces a rkk score that is more 
linear rather than the u s d  logarithmic metric. The risk ranking used in the FY 2006 assessment 
provides a threshold risk score that is suggested by the assessment team and the independent 
&ewer to be used to identify items requiring further attention Caution should be used with 
actions such as prioritization or determining risk distribution. 
RESULTS OF THE FY 2006 ASSESSMENT 
Identification of all msidual chemical risk concerns assessed, along with their relative risk score, 
are provided in "I?-29577, Plutonium Finishing Piant Chemical Huzmd Assessment FY 2006 - 
Datu [4], Hazardous conditions identified during the verification workshops that represent 
general categories of wncern are listed below: 
( 1) Sealed vessels and pipelines containing emugh residual plutoniUm to generate hydrogen and 
potentially overpressure the vessellpipeline or reach the Lower Flammability Limit (LFL). 
(2) Vessels or pipelines with residual mounts of liquid acid or caustic that could leak onto a 
worker or be available for contact. 
(3) Vessels or pipelines with residual mounts of toxic chemical residues that are open or could 
be breached allowing dry residual material to migrate M o r  become airborne. 
(4) Vessels or pipelines with residual contamination that are open or could be breached allowhg 
dry residual material to migrate andlor be airborne. 
Key assumptions included the following: 
0 Vessels or pipelines estimated to contain 15 grams or more of plutonium were assumed to 
represent a fissile quantity and were assigned to Hazard Group '2.' 
Ventilation systems continue to perform their safety function during long term layup. 
4 Surveillance continues at the complex as-is during long term layup. 
Fire Protection Systems continue to perform their safety function during long term layup. 
These assumptions need to be protected. Fm example, there is evidence that the E-3 and E-4 
ventilation systems are deteriodng. The ability of the E-3 and E-4 systems to continue to 
perform their safety function needs to be assured. 
Relative risk ranking scores can range from '0' (Le,, hammil removed) to '100' (Le., worst case) 
and am listed in HNF-29577 [4] and score distributions for the FY 2006 assessment are 
provided. The score of '17' was chosen to reflect items requiring attention prior to layup. 
Sevenken was chosen because it is the score that would be obtained if dl likelihood and severity 
factors are as low as possible (Le., '1 '), but the uncertainty (Le., data quality) was marginal 
9 
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(k, '3') and hazardous material (Le., hazard p u p }  was highly reactive (Le,, a hazard group 
score of '1' or '2'). This was judged the lowest score that still represents a concern that should be 
a d d r e S S d .  
The FY 2006 assessment items were classified into two categories: { 1) nigh priority' and 
(2) 'deferred until after PFP layup.' All FY 2006 assessment items are listed in Appendix A of 
the report. 
f ior i t~ :  High priority items have been determined through the relative risk values as 
requiring response actions prior to PFP layup. 
Deferred until after PFP lavup: These items are judged as items that pose minimal relative risk 
and can be deferred safely until d e r  the PFP layup interval has elapsed. 
Figure 1 provides an example of items {identi&! in the FY 2003 assessment} that were 
dispositioned and have a FY 2006 relative risk ranking score of '0.' 
FF.. , . . i . : 
.- 
Figure 1 - The rem03 ofthe bulk chemical fead tanks and draining ofthe Ghemical t d  lines 
from mom 336 and 337 is one of the many efforts to m a  chemical concerns fiom the 
hi l i ty .  
Since the objective of the c h d d  hazards assessment was to focus on the s y m  being 
prepad for layup at PFP, c e d  systems that we to remain active dwring the layup period were 
excluded h m  this assessment effort. Additionally, the 241-2 Liquid Liquid Waste Treatment 
Facility was not assessed because the system is Unaergoing closure and D&D. Because these 
items were not part of the FY 2006 assessmet effort, their mkhg scores (&om the 2003 
10 
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RCHA) were deleted from the scoring distribution determination. The items remain in the 
database, however. Figure 2 shows the relative hazard ranking of items from the FY 2006 effort. 
"1 
80 . 
70 - 
80 - 
w -  
40. 
5 0 -  
20 - 
10 - 
0 ,  
Hazard Score 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of chemical systems (items) by the hazard score grouping or bin. 
The higher the hazard score, the higher the concern for the risks remaining in the chemical 
system. 
During the assessment, evaluators determined that the 242-2 Facility and Room 232A of the 
234-52 Plutonium Fabrication Facility, would not be accessed for any reason during the lay-up 
period. Severe contamination in these two locations prevents access without extensive protocol. 
No events were ideritified that could produce consequences to workers who were not physicdly 
present in the 242-2 Facility or in Room 232A during an event. Therefore, physical injury or 
exposwe potential to humans was assumed not to be possible. 
Data uncertainty caused high scoring for items associated with the poly cube-impacted scction of 
the 26-inch vacuum system (HNF-29593, Datu Quality Objective Process Summary Report For 
26-Inch Vacuum System [S]), the tanks in the 242-2 Facility, and equipment inside the 236-2 
galley gloveboxes. In the Plutonium Finishing Plarlt Planning Case: PES RL-011 { Transmittal 
of PZutoniurn Finishing Hun# Planning Ca;se[6]), Fluor Hanford, Inc. has submitted plans tfl 
further chamxeize these areas as part of layup (for the 26-inch vacuum system) or as part of 
acceierated D&D (for the 242-2 Facility and the 236-2 gallery gloveboxes). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The FY 2006 assessment was performed to evaluate potential chemical hazards to determine 
actions necessary to allow for Iong-term layup of the facility. The total of 355 items were 
evaluated during the FY 2006 assessment of which 85 items have been completed, i.e., tank or 
equipment removed. Figure 3 provides an example of equipment removal. 
c, 
. .  
! 
. . :  ;v ’ A: . . . .-:;< L ,..,.. - .  
Figure 3 - Many of the chemid systems are located in likhe’wloveboxes withj L the process - -  
facility. Glovebox HC-7C (above)-once contained m a y  large PlutoniWn product stomge tanks 
that have now been m o v e d  by the project, 
There were 86 High Priority residual chemical concerns posing a significant risk. Relative risk 
values reached 65. Some level of disposition was recommended for these items (c.g. removal, 
periodic surveillance, or repair). Recommendations from the assessment include the following; 
(1) Sealed vessels and larger diameter pipelines containing emugh residual pluhnium to 
generate hydrogen and potentially overpressure the v e s d  or reach the LFL should be vented 
or shown to be not sealed, 
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(2) Surveillance be dncained to detect leaks from vessels or pipelines with residual runounts of 
liquid acid or -tic that could leak onto a worker or be a d a b l e  for contact. 
(3) Surveillance be maintainsd for vessels or pipelines with residual amounts of toxic chemical 
residues that are open or could be breached allowing dry residual rnakial to migrate andor 
be airborne. 
(4) Surveillance be maintained for vessels or pipelines with residual contamination that are open 
or could be breached allowing dry residual m~terial to m i p k  and/or become airborne. 
(5 )  The ability of the E 3  and E4 ventilation systems to perform heir safety function be 
maintained during long term layup. This may require that further assessments of aging 
sections be performsd as the E3 and E4 represent vital saf'.'. systems, 
(6) The ability of the Fire Protection Systems to perform their saf&y function be maintained 
during term layup. 
The FY 2006 chemical h m d  assessment was developed in conjunction with the PFP process 
facility layup plan, a documented dety analysis based hazards assessment of the propod PFP 
layup condition, and an accelerated work scope plan (FH-0503662A R2 [6]> to support future 
plernned work scape schedule and funding. The integration of these documents and plans has 
resulted in developing the path forward discussed below. 
As a result of the h a r d  analysis performed for the hyup Scenario, the hazard mdysis team 
determined that the radiation controls currently in place and projected to be in place at PFP for 
the duration of the layup period are adequate to protect human health and the environment. 
As noted in the PFP layup plan, additional characterization is planned during the layup phase for 
the 26-inch vacuum system to more M y  determine the nature of the chemical M s  associated 
with the c h d d  holdup in the system. In HNF-29S93 [5 ] ,  the data quality objectives team 
concluded that there were insd3icient data to determine if certain sections of the vacuum system 
umtaining chemical holdup were subjsct to autocatalytic explosive reactions. Therefore, further 
m h ,  including sampIii and analysis is p b d .  
The current p l d n g  case for DdkD activities, &scribed in the PFP planning case document 
(FM-0503662A R2 [6]),  that are planned for execution during the layup period will, upon 
completion, pmperly disposition or characterize the following items: 
The planned acceleration of gallery glovebox D&D in PRI? (2362) will result in the 
mitigation or characterization of hazards associated with items that relate to the PRF gallery 
gloveboxes, 
The D&D work planned for the 242-2 will result in the M e r  characterization 
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0 The planned acceIer&on of the 216-29 crib w o r b p e  consisting of D&D of the 21 6-2-9 
above grads structures will eliminate or characterize the hazards associated with item 437, 
which is the drain line from 234-52 to the 216-2-9 crib. 
The following items will be dispositimed as part of the layup plan tasking: 
At the 291 -2 building, stabXing the galvanized ducting wiIl mitigatdstabilize the hazard 
associated with item 353 by containing the contamination within the ducting. 
The hazard of hydrogen acczrmulation in the process transfer pipelines will be mitigated by 
venting the pipelines to the gloveboxes that are ventilated to the E4 system. 
The b m d s  of corrosivity in the chemical acid pipelines will be mitigated by draining the 
pipelines. 
The primmy hazard in the pulsar glovebox Will be mitigated by draining the glovebox. 
The 26-inch vacuum system will be vented and the silencer tank will be isolated fiom the 
main process water pipeline to prevent the inflow of wata into the system which contains 
plutonium. The sections of the 26-inch vacuum system that were effected by the poly cube 
stabilization effort will be M e r  characterized. 
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